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SAJN V. CEDAR RAPIDS COMMUNITY SCHOOL
DISTRICT: PROVIDING SPECIAL PROTECTION FOR
STUDENT-ATHLETES?
I. INTRODUCTION

Long ago, legal scholars held a funeral service for the tort of
educational malpractice. From time to time, academics exhume
the tort in law review articles for a post-mortem analysis of
what courts view as its fatal flaws and to beat their chests in
collective lamentation. Despite this, it is universally accepted
that to use the term "educational malpractice" in a cause of action is to doom it to dismissal. That is why it was an enormous
surprise when the Iowa Supreme Court, in April of 2001,
breathed new life into the defunct tort by denying the defendant Cedar Rapids Community School District's motion for
1
summary judgment. In that case, a student sued the school
district for negligent misrepresentation by a school guidance
2
counselor. The Iowa Supreme Court's holding was only the
second time in educational malpractice's thirty-year life span
where the claim emerged victorious from the jaws of summary
judgment. One explanation for this unusual holding is that the
court was trying to protect a category of persons considered especially vulnerable to exploitation: student-athletes.
This case note will analyze the Sain holding, beginning in
Section II by reciting the facts of Sain. Section III will examine
the judiciary's overwhelmingly adverse response to claims of
educational malpractice. Sain will be contrasted with Brown v.
3
Compton Unified School District, having almost the same facts
but the opposite outcome to show how this case would ordinarily be decided. Section IV will examine the rationale the Sain
court used to uphold the negligent misrepresentation claim.
Section V will explore the possibility that Sain received differ-

1. Sain u. Cedar Rapid Community Sch. Dist., 626 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Iowa 2001).
2. ld. at 120.
3. 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 171 (App. 2d Dist. 1998).
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ent treatment because he is a student-athlete. Section VI will
discuss the constitutional arguments that could bolster judicial
recognition of a special relationship between student-athletes
and educational institutions. Section VII will discuss possible
impediments to recognizing a special student-athlete/school relationship and also discuss how Sain could serve as precedent
for special protection of student-athletes.
II. THE FACTS
The plaintiff, Bruce Sain, was a student at Jefferson High
4
School in the defendant school district. He was an unusually
gifted basketball player who planned on using a basketball
scholarship to finance his college education. In order to be eligible to play college basketball, he had to satisfy the NCAA's
high school course requirements. Sain had already satisfied
many of the NCAA's requirements by his senior year, but with
three trimesters left, he still needed to take three approved
English courses. He completed one approved class his first trimester but disliked the course in which he was enrolled the
second trimester. He met with Bowen, the school guidance
counselor, who was generally familiar with the NCAA's requirements, to try to find a substitute class. Bowen suggested
that Sain take a brand new course called "Technical Communications" and assured Sain that the NCAA clearinghouse would
5
approve the course.
The school, however, did not include the course on the list of
6
classes submitted to the NCAA for approval. The final trimester of high school, Sain completed a third English credit in an
approved course and accepted a full five-year basketball schol7
arship at Northern Illinois University. Shortly after graduation, however, the NCAA informed Sain that his "Technical
Communications" course was not approved by the clearinghouse. The NCAA refused Sain's application for a waiver making Sain one-third credit short of meeting the English requirements. As a result, Sain lost his scholarship and was unable to
4. Sain, 626 N.W.2d at 118-19.
5. !d. at 119. Bowen and the school district deny telling Sain that the course
would be approved by the NCAA. However, for the purposes of summary judgment, the
facts are considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. ld. at 119 n. 1.
6. !d. at 119.
7. !d. at 119-20.
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attend college or compete in Division I basketball for the 1996s
97 school year.
Sain sued the school district for negligently failing to submit the course to the NCAA clearinghouse and for negligent
misrepresentation by the counselor in providing false information about which courses would satisfy the NCAA's requirements. The district court held that no cause of action existed as
9
a matter of law and dismissed both counts. The Iowa Supreme
Court upheld summary judgment for the defendant school district on the negligence claim, so that portion of the case will not
be discussed in this case note. However, the Iowa Supreme
Court reversed summary judgment on the negligent misrepre10
sentation claim. It stated:
The tort of negligent misrepresentation is broad enough to include a duty for a high school guidance counselor to use reasonable care in providing specific information to a student
when the guidance counselor has knowledge of the specific
need for the information and provides the information to the
student in the course of a counselor-student relationship, and
a student reasonably relies upon the information under
circumstances in which the counselor knows or should know
11
that the student is relying upon the information.

Ill. EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE CASE HISTORY

The last educational malpractice case decided by the Iowa
12
Supreme Court before Sain was Moore v. Vanderloo. In
Moore, the Iowa Supreme Court flatly refused to recognize
three types of educational malpractice claims. The first type of
educational malpractice claim targets the substance of the curriculum or how it is taught. Under this theory, a claim arises
when a student alleges that the school failed to teach the student basic academic skills thus breaching either a common law
duty, constitutional provision, or statutory provision. The second type of educational malpractice claim arises when a student alleges that the school improperly placed the student in,
removed the student from, or negligently did not place the stu8. Id. at 120.
9. Id.

10. ld. at 129.
11. Id.
12. 386 N.W.2d 108 (Iowa 1986).
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dent in a special education program or other program. The
third type of educational malpractice claim arises when a student alleges that the school failed to supervise the student's
13
performance. The Moore court stated, "[w]ith the exception of
one case, the courts in each of these three types of actions have
unanimously failed to recognize a cause of action for educa14
tional malpractice."
The most frequently cited case arising in an educational
malpractice setting is Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School
15
District. Though this case is twenty-five years old, every court
facing an educational malpractice claim invokes the rationale
in this case almost superstitiously, as if it were a talisman to
ward off a storm of calamities that would inevitably descend
upon the U.S. judicial system if a court were to recognize a
claim of educational malpractice.

A. Public Policy Concerns
There are many legitimate public policy concerns inherent
in educational malpractice claims. The court in Peter W. identifies the following policy concerns: first, there is no workable
standard of care against which to judge an educator's conduct.
Pedagogical techniques vary greatly with no consensus as to
their respective efficacy. Second, there is no reasonable degree
of certainty that plaintiff suffered an identifiable or redressible
injury within the law of negligence. Third, there is no direct
causal connection between plaintiffs conduct and the injury
16
professed. As the court stated, "[s]ubstantial professional authority attests that the achievement of literacy in the schools,
or its failure, are influenced by a host of factors which affect
the pupil subjectively, from outside the formal teaching process, and beyond the control of its ministers. They may be physi-

13. !d. at 113.
14. !d. at 114 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted) (referring to Burger ex rel. M. u.
Montana, 649 P.2d 425 (Mont. 1982)). In Burger, the Montana Supreme Court recognized a cause of action when a school negligently misplaces a student in a special education program. The court held that "[t]he school authorities owed the child a duty of
reasonable care in testing her and placing her in an appropriate special education program." Burger, 649 P.2d at 427. However, this remained, until Sain., the only instance
in which a court failed to grant summary judgment in favor of a defendant school district on an educational malpractice type of claim.
15. 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (App. 1st Dist. 1976).
16. Id. at 861.
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schools and open the floodgates to future litigation.l 8
In addition to these concerns, other courts have added
many more. For example, courts fear that recognizing educational malpractice claims would "force the courts blatantly to
interfere with the internal operations and daily workings of an
19
educational institution." Public schools' discretion to implement new programs or make changes would be limited because
they would be forced to perpetually monitor whether such decisions might open them to liability. Courts are also afraid that
recognizing this tort would interpose their judicial judgment
for that of the legislature who ordinarily defines standards of
20
competency.
Many of the cited cases are relatively old, but the courts'
fears of these adverse public policy concerns are so severe that
all cases alleging educational malpractice have been summarily
dismissed for twenty years. Thus, the major cases from twentyfive years ago constitute the "last judicial word" on a tort that
has become a judicial pariah. As one commentator said, "the
question of whether academic institutions owe a duty to impart
a minimum level of proficiency has been analyzed by the judiciary as a question of law dependent on public policy considerations,"21 often, it might be added, to the preclusion of any
analysis as to whether the underlying claim is legitimate, or
despite the fact that it would be deemed so in any context but
an educational setting.
B. Brown v. Compton Unified School District: Same Facts,
Different Outcome

In another case with almost the same facts as Sain, these
public policy concerns were enough to outweigh the claim al-

17. !d.
18. !d.; see Hunter v. Bd. of Educ., 439 A.2d 582, 585 (Md. 1982); Moore, 386
N.W.2d at 114.
19. Moore, 386 N.W.2d at 115; see Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391
N.E.2d 1352, 1354 (N.Y. 1979).
20. Moore, 386 N.W.2d at 115; see Swidryk v. St. Michael's Med. Ctr., 493 A.2d
641, 644-45 (N.J. Super. L. Div. 1985).
21. Timothy Davis, Examining Educational Malpractice Jurisprudence: Should a
Cause of Action be Created for Student-Athletes?, 69 Dcnv. U. L. Rev. 57, 96 (1992).
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though the court rested its rejection of the claim on statutorily
conferred immunity for public employees acting within the
22
scope of their employment. In Brown v. Compton Unified
School District, a student sued his high school guidance counselor and school district alleging that he lost his four year basketball scholarship to USC because of the counselor's negligent
misrepresentation in advising him to take a particular science
course which she believed would satisfy the NCAA's requirements. USC withdrew Brown's scholarship when it turned out
23
that the course did not meet NCAA requirements.
The court held that the school had no duty to Brown, and
thus there was no cause of action for negligent misrepresenta24
tion. There was no duty despite the fact that it was even
clearer in this case that there was a special relationship then it
was in Sain. Compton Unified School District proactively recruited Brown to attend high school and play basketball in its
district by telling him that Manual Dominguez High School
would allow him to satisfy the NCAA requirements for athletic
eligibilit~. Brown relied on that promise in transferring
2
schools. Furthermore, unlike Sain, where the school denied
making a statement that the "technical communications"
26
course would meet NCAA requirements, in Brown, the principal of the high school sent a letter to the NCAA requirements
committee stating that Brown's failure to take one required
course was "completely the result of misadvisement on the part
27
of one of our school's academic counselors."
Despite the school's clear admission of guilt, the Brown
court found that "[p]olicy considerations preclude 'an actionable
"duty of care" in persons and agencies who administer the aca28
demic phases of the public educational process'." Not surprisingly, the court cited the policy rationale in Peter W. v. San
Francisco Unified School District in declining to recognize
Brown's claim and stated, "[t]his strong policy consideration

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Brown, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 172-73.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 172-73.
ld. at 171.
Sain, 626 N.W.2d at 119 n. 1.
Brown, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 172.
Id. at 172 (quoting Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861).
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may outweigh the allegation that Brown undertook a change in
29
circumstances in reliance on the school district."
The court based its dismissal of the claim on statutory immunity, and was thus precluded from making a definitive
30
judgment on the identified policy concerns. However, it
seemed clear that the court would have dismissed the claim
31
anyway for public policy reasons. On identical facts, the court
in Sain went through a detailed analysis of the same public
32
policy concerns to show that they did not apply to the facts
33
though the Brown court undoubtedly felt otherwise.
IV. SPECIFIC RATIONALE OF SAIN
The Sain Court went out of its way to find that considerations of public policy, which had been lethal to every other case
34
in the last twenty years except one, did not apply. The Sain
Court distinguished Sain from every other educational malpractice case by stating, "[w]e must be careful not to reject all
claims that arise out of a school environment under the umbrella of educational malpractice. Instead, the specific facts of
each case must be considered in light of the relevant policy concerns that drive the rejection of the educational malpractice actions.":Js If this was the court's way of saying that it was willing
to distinguish the instant case on its facts, they were the first
court to consider doing so in twenty years.
The Sain court identified the five public policy concerns
listed in Moore v. Vanderloo, and explained why each did not
36
apply, or did not apply with equal weight in the Sain case.
There was no interference with educational discretion because
"this case does not challenge classroom methodology or theories
37
of education." It does not interfere with legislative standards
of competency, nor is there any fear that an appropriate standard of care cannot be articulated. The court concluded that it

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

/d. at 172.
/d. at 173.
See id. at 172.
Sain, 626 N.W.2d at 121-22.
See Brown, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 172.
Sain, 626 N.W.2d at 121-22.
/d. at 122 (citation omitted).
/d. at 121-22.
/d. at 122.
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would be possible to formulate a standard of care because the
38
situation is analogous to misrepresentation by professionals.
Sain proves that these public policy considerations do not
have to be lethal to educational malpractice suits. Public policy
concerns can be resolved when a duty is imposed by the court
on the school district. The court considered the other two factors of the test as well but held that a school district's duty
could be severely curtailed by putting stringent limitations on
39
who can recover. The court thought that severe limitations on
duty would be sufficient to prevent a flood of ensuing litigation.40 Clearly, the court intended to severely limit those to
whom the school had a duty. Perhaps the Sain Court was trying to create a cause of action to be used exclusively by studentathletes.
Considering the statements made by the court, it is not a
stretch for courts to recognize a duty of reasonable care in preventing negligent misrepresentation. Although the court was
careful to emphasize, more than once, that there can be no duty
of care in situations falling under the category of educational
41
malpractice. However, the court stated that in other circumstances "(a] school clearly owes a duty of reasonable care," such
as maintaining the physical facilities in safe condition or su42
pervising students. The court stated that it has recognized the
tort of negligent misrepresentation in many other circumstances such as permitting a party to recover for reasonable re43
liance upon financial statements prepared by an accountant.
44
It applied the same test that is used for other professionals,
which is embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section
552:

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id. at 125.
See id.
Id. at 122.
Id.
I d. at 123 (citing Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969)).
Id.
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One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary
interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others
in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon
the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or com45
petence in obtaining or communicating the information.
The Iowa Supreme Court decided that the Sain case satis46
fied every requirement of the Restatement's Test. The court
even applied the requirement that the informabon be supplied
47
"for the guidance of others in their business transactions" to
4
the student/counselor relationship. H The dissent objected vigorously on this point stating that suggesting course curriculum
is in no way a "business transaction."
[T]he majority's logic flies in the face of experience. To accept
the majority's decision, one must be willing to view the mentaring relationship between a guidance counselor and a student as no different than a business relationship between a
purveyor of information and a consumer. I disagree with that
premise. We may live in an information age, but experience
tells me the sharing of knowledge in school is different than
41
the sale of information in the marketplace. ~
In previous cases, the tort of negligent misrepresentation
had only been recognized in the context of commercial transactions. The court conceded, "no jurisdiction has recognized a tort
50
in the context of a school counselor and a student." The court
justified its expansion of the tort by pointing out that neither
Section 552 nor Iowa case law requires that the case's subject
matter arise in a commercial or business setting. Gl It only requires that the defendant be a person in the "business of supplying information to others," which the court found applies to
')2
a school counselor.'

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Restatement !Second) of"Torts
8ain, 626 N.W.2d at 128.
Restatement (Second) of'Torts
Sain, 626 N.W.2d at 12il.
ld. at 129.
50. !d. at 12fi.
51. !d.
52. !d. at 126.

~

552 ( 1994).

~

552.
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The test the court applied from Section 552 is stringent and
difficult to satisfy, but the court plunged through it, seemingly
undaunted by the new territory into which it was expanding
the tort. The dissent attributes this willingness to impose liability on the court's desire to afford special protection to the
53
unique needs of student-athletes.
V. THE CASE FOR RECOGNIZING A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN SCHOOLS AND STUDENT-ATHLETES

A. Public Policy Arguments in Support of a Special
Relationship
In the last few years, many legal scholars have suggested
that the unique needs of student-athletes can be met by expanding schools' duty to protect the interests of their studentathletes. The majority in Sain considered these arguments and
cited a law review article entitled, Examining Educational
Malpractice Jurisprudence: Should a Cause of Action Be Cre54
ated for Student-Athletes? For the purpose of brevity, this
note will refer to student-athletes by the masculine pronoun
because most female student-athletes do not experience the
pressure that male athletes do to focus on athletics to the neglect of academics. To the extent that they do, however, the
55
same arguments apply to female athletes. ·
The Davis article urges the imposition of a sp~cial relation6
ship between a university and a student-athlete," but, as the
Sain Court recognized, the same logic applies to a public high
school and a student-athlete. The gist of the argument is that a
college and an athlete are mutually dependent on one another.
A student-athlete generates substantial revenue for the university, and, in return, the athlete depends on the university to
57
provide him with an education. Furthermore, in participating
in school athletics, the student-athlete submits his educational
autonomy to the direction of the coaches and staff who often

53. Id. at 130.
54. Id. at 121 (citing Davis, supra n. 21 at 61).
55. Sarah E. Gohl, Student Author, A Lesson in English and Gender: Title IX and
the Male Student-Athlete, 50 Duke L.J. 1123 (2001).
56. Davis, supra n. 21 at 59.
57. Id. at 92.
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discourage certain majors because those majors' time demands
might conflict with the student-athlete's practice times.
Coaches and staff may also choose the student-athlete's classes
for him to help him avoid classes that might be too challeng58
ing. The article suggests that student-athletes "become dependent on agents of their schools to protect their academic in59
terests. " The article points out that though the relationship is
one of mutual dependency, the school is the dominant party,
and thus acquires a duty to "protect[] the interests of student60
athletes" at least as well as they protect their own.
Though the article specifically addressed the relationship
between a university and a student-athlete, the same concerns
apply at the high school level. This is particularly true as
sports at all levels become more commercialized, and schools
have more incentive to treat athletes as marketable commodities rather than just students.
Court recognition of a special relationship between schools
and their student-athletes will prevent the type of inequitable
result that occurred in the Brown case referred to above. In
Brown, the Compton Unified School District went out of its way
to recruit Brown to play basketball for their school district, assuring him that his new high school would assist him in com61
pleting all of the NCAA eligibility requirements. Brown appears to have fulfilled his end of the agreement in playing
basketball well enough to win a full-tuition scholarship to USC.
By its own admission, however, the school breached its end of
the agreement. The Sain court appeared to be trying to avoid
62
this type of inequitable result.
The dissent in Sain recognized the majority opinion's rationale for what it was: "[i]mplicit in the majority's reasoning is
the suggestion that, when it comes to NCAA eligibility rules
63
and athletic scholarships, business is the name of the game."
Seen in this light, it does not seem as though referring to a
guidance counselor advising a student- athlete as guiding others in their business transactions is such a stretch. Perhaps the

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 93.
ld.
Id. at 94.
Brown, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171-72.
ld. at 172.
Sain, 626 N.W.2d at 130.
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Sain majority was simply enlightened enough to recognize a
business dealing when they saw it.
B. Recognizing a Special Relationship in Other Student-Athlete
Contexts
So far, this note has explored the potential for the exploitation of student-athletes in only one context, but the wisdom of
the Sain court becomes more apparent in exploring other contexts in which the potential for student-athlete exploitation is
high. The most famous student-athlete case is Ross v. Creigh64
ton University. Creighton University recruited high school
basketball star Kevin Ross and offered him a scholarship despite the fact that they knew it would be almost impossible for
him to succeed academically at the university. In 1978, the average student registering at Creighton had received 23.2 points
out of a possible 36 on the American College Placement Test
(ACT). Ross, on the other hand, had received a 9. With great effort, the coaching staff kept him eligible for the basketball team
for four years by enrolling him in classes such as ceramics,
marksmanship, and the respective theories of basketball, track
and field, and football. Such haphazard class selection was
against University rules, but the school made a special excep5
tion to keep Ross eligible.(j Ross claimed that the school contributed to his academic failure by "failing to provide 'adequate
and competent tutoring services"' and "failing 'to afford the
plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to take full advantage of tu66
toring sessions'." Finally, the school enrolled him in remedial
courses at a local private elementary school and high school,
but it was too little too late. At the end of his eligibility, Ross
had no degree, carried a D average, and had the reading skills
67
of a seventh-grader and language skills of a fourth-grader.
The district court dismissed Ross's ensuing lawsuit against
Creighton University by stating, "educational malEractice has
8
been repeatedly rejected by the American courts." The court

64. 740 F. Supp. 1319 (N.D. Ill. 1990), reu'd in part and afl'd in part, 957 F.2d 410
(7th Cir. 1992); see Johnny C. Parker, Educational Malpractice: A Tort is Born, ;39 Clev.
St. L. Rev. 301, 303-05 (1991).
65. Ross, 740 F. Supp. at 1322.
66. Id. at 1331.
67. Id. at 1322.
68. Id. at 1327.
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cited the usual public policy concerns as its rationale: difficulty
of determining proximate cause, lack of dut~, and the possibil6
ity of triggering large amounts oflitigation.
Applying the rationale in the Davis article, the school would
be liable if the court found that the school did not "give at least
as much attention to protecting the interests of student70
athletes as to protecting their own [interest]." Ross and
Creighton were clearly mutually dependant on each other.
Ross, as a prominent local basketball player, helped generate
considerable revenue for Creighton University by helping the
basketball team's overall success and by attracting fans to
watch his performance. As the dominant party in the relationship, the university had a special duty to protect Ross's interests, which they neglected or intentionally breached by misleading him and causing him to believe that if he matriculated
at Creighton, he would succeed academically. The university
also neglected his interests by persuading him to take "soft"
courses in order to maintain his eligibility, rather than encouraging him to take courses that are useful in obtaining a degree.
Under this analysis, as the dominant party exercising control
over Ross's academic decisions, the university assumed a special obligation to protect his interests at least as well as they
protected their own interest and should be liable for failing to
do so.
71
In a similar case, Jones v. Williams, a student-athlete
claimed that an Idaho Junior College and the Detroit Board of
Education "academically carried" him in order to keep him eligible for basketball, despite the fact that he could neither read
72
nor write. Jones claimed that peer ridicule because of his illit73
eracy caused him a nervous breakdown.
The schools treated the students in both these cases differently because they were gifted athletes. Instead of holding
them to the same standard as regular students or helping them
improve their skills so that they could achieve that standard,
the schools exploited their athletic prowess for the school's economic gain until the student-athlete's eligibility expired. Upon
completion of their athletic eligibility, the schools left them to
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

!d. at 1328-29.
Davis, supra n. 21 at 94.
431 N.W.2d 419 (Mich. App. 1988).
!d. at 422.
!d.
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fend for themselves with the sub-par skills they had acquired.
Davis characterizes the relationship between a student-athlete
74
and a university as "institutionalized powerlessness." Perhaps judicial intervention is necessary to correct this imbalance
75
and the resulting abuse of superior power.
In her article, "A Lesson in English and Gender: Title IX
and the Male Student-Athlete," Sarah Gohl adds to the argument that student-athletes require special protections in order
76
to prevent their exploitation. She argues that athletically talented males are socialized to believe that sacrificing their focus
77
on academics to focus on sports is a fair trade-off. Young male
athletes are socialized to believe that they will not need a good
education to succeed but instead will receive generous compen78
sation for their athletic skills as a professional athlete. Iowa
State football coach Jim Walden stated that, "[n]ot more than
20 percent of the football players go to college for an education."79 Most college athletes are there because they are hoping
to turn pro. They do not object when the coaching staff schedules practices during scheduled study or tutoring times, as in
80
Jackson v. Drake University, or when tutors complete the ath81
letes' term papers, as occurred at the University ofTennessee.
They do not object because they plan to turn pro and will have
no use for an education.
Universities feed these notions by encouraging studentathletes to spend more time improving their athletic prowess
than studying because student-athletes have become powerful
revenue-generating machines. What these students do not realize is that out of 50,000 NCAA football players and 13,000
NCAA male basketball players, only 310 per year make it to
the NFL and 50 a year are drafted into the NBA. This is a 3.3%
82
chance and a 1.9% chance, respectively.

74. Davis, supra n. 21 at 94.
75. !d.
76. Gohl, supra n. 55 at 1126.
77. !d. at 1126-27.
7R. !d. at 1132-43.
79. /d. at 1134 (quoting Andrew Zimbalist, Unpaid Professionals: Commercialism
and Conflict in Big-Time College Sports :19 (Princeton U. Press l~l9fl)).
80. 778 F. Supp. 1490, 1492 (S.D. Iowa 1991).
81. Gohl, supra n. 55 at 11~ l.
82. /d. ai U:H.
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Under the current system, universities have no duty and
thus no incentive to protect any academic interest of their student-athletes. Because they have no duty, most schools are not
concerned with seeing that their student-athletes graduate or
leave their universities equipped with skills to help them succeed in their post-university lives. While universities certainly
cannot be held liable if a student does not succeed, they can
and should be liable if they actively contribute to the student's
failure and prevent their success in order to further their own
interests. For this reason, it can be argued that courts should
create a special relationship between schools and their studentathletes in order to protect student-athletes from exploitation.

VI. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF A SPECIAL
STUDENT-ATHLETE/SCHOOL RELATIONSHIP

The source of the problem between student athletes and the
schools they attend is that the legislative branch has been unresponsive to the needs of student-athletes. The argument for a
special relationship between student-athletes and their school
would be bolstered if there was a constitutional basis for recognizing a special relationship in the student-athlete/school relationship. So far, however, student-athletes have been unable to
obtain redress when they are unfairly forced by academic institutions to choose between involvement in athletics and the opportunity to obtain a sound education. The nature of the injury
lends itself to a Fourteenth Amendment argument: that they
have either been denied due process, or that they are being denied equal protection of the laws, student-athletes could provide a compelling reason for courts to intervene on their behalf.
This note will describe a hypothetical due process claim for
purposes of illustration.
Student-athletes could argue that the courts' perpetual denial of their educational malpractice claims is a violation of due
process. Student athletes have been denied due process of law
because of their lack of political power compared to the politically powerful educational institutions. This inherent imbalance between student-athletes and education institutions
means that, without judicial intervention, student athletes'
rights cannot be adequately protected.
Well established case law provides for judicial intervention
when legislation fails to adequately protect the constitutional
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rights of an underrepresented group. Footnote four of United
8
States v. Carolene Products a has been used to strike down legislation that is detrimental to "discrete and insular minorities,"
or that "tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities."84 However, the representation-reinforcement rationale of
footnote four can also be invoked to provide a liberal interpretation of existing legislation when the legislative branch fails to
adequately protect the interests of an under-represented minority through existing legislation.
It cannot be argued that existing legislation adequately
protects student-athletes. The only attempt Congress has made
to protect the interests of student-athletes is through Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972, which provides that
"[no] person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or ac85
tivity receiving Federal financial assistance." This statute is
commonly thought of as providing equal opportunities for female athletes, but it also protects any student-athlete from being denied equal access to educational opportunities.
Courts have considered Title IX much too vague, however,
to provide a cause of action for student-athletes who are denied
equal access to educational opportunities. Neither the legislature, nor the judiciary through interpretation of Title IX has
ever provided enhanced protection to student-athletes on the
basis of Title IX. Indeed, as Kevin Ross and many other student-athletes have found, they have no recourse, even when
they are the victims of what would be actionable negligence or
deliberate mistreatment in any context except a student-school
context. The kind of outrageous treatment received by studentathletes would never be tolerated in any other context.
Under the representation-reinforcement schema, a studentathlete would be able to say that they are being denied due
process because neither Title IX nor judicial interpretation of
Title IX affords them any protection from actionable negligence
by their schools. Student-athletes, in their "institutional powerlessness" could be considered a discrete and insular minority,

83. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
84. !d. at 153 n. 4.
85. 20 U.S.C. ~ 1681(a) (2000).
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which cannot remedy its own situation through the political
process because of its relative political powerlessness. Though
students are not blocked by any statutory impediment from
participating in the political process, students as a whole do
not have the financial resources nor the political experience to
be able to effectively lobby for political change. There are no
student-athletes in Congress and unlike educators, there is no
interest group organized specifically to protect their interests.
On the other hand, The National Education Association
(NEA) has 2.6 million members and is the largest union in the
United States and one of the most powerful lobbies in Wash86
ington. One political writer noted of the NEA's political
87
power, "[t]his kind of clout makes it a political kingmaker."
During the 2000 Democratic National Convention, one in
twelve delegates was a member of the NEA. The total number
of NEA delegates, 350, was larger than the entire delegation
88
from the state of California. Educational institutions and public schools have both the financial and political resources to effectively block legislation in many jurisdictions that would
abolish their governmental immunity to suit or be otherwise
detrimental to their interests. If it were not so, we would not
have seen unprecedented expansion in all areas of tort liability
in the last thirty years while in the area of educational liability
alone, there has been no expanded liability. Indeed, the tort of
educational malpractice has been all but dead. This is because
educational institutions and public schools are one of the most
effective and politically powerful lobbies in the United States.
Public schools and universities are so powerful that their
political clout has been sufficient to prevent any recognition of
the tort of educational malpractice. At the same time, liability
has expanded greatly in other areas of tort law despite the existence of many of the same impediments that have completely
prevented expanded liability in education. Under the common
law, school districts and educational institutions were not li89
able for injuries resulting from their negligence. Similarly,
under the common law, a plaintiff could not recover for the
R6 .• Joel Mowbray, The NEA's Political Machine: New Evidence Indicates Misuse
of Tax-Exempt Dues 1
<http://wv.'W .capital research .org/pub Iications/lahor watch/lwO 111. pdf> (Nov. 200 1).
R7. ld.
Ril. ld.
R~. Parker, supra n. ()4, at :Jl :l.
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common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
(liED). As late as 1934, there was no protectable interest in
90
mental and emotional stability. Since then, however, the tort
has become recognized and even included in the Restatement of
Torts.
Courts didn't recognize liED for many of the same policy
reasons they don't recognize educational malpractice: proxi91
mate cause and lack of judicial remedy. The courts have resolved their policy concerns sufficiently to recognize a cause of
action for liED, but the courts still claim that the policy issues
implicated in proximate cause and lack of judicial remedy are
unresolvable for the purpose of educational malpractice litigation.
These courts' claims may not be accurate though. The New
York Court of Appeals in Donohue u. Copiague Union Free
School District, while refusing to uphold the cause of action,
recognized that J.?roximate cause was not an impenetrable barrier to recovery. "The ... court found that, despite the obvious
difficulties, a plaintiff might indeed be able to demonstrate that
defendant caused his or her injury. It also noted that an appli93
cable standard of care might be found." :
Although these same policy issues have been successfully
resolved in medical malpractice and other professional malpractice cases, the combined force of policy concerns and political clout have allowed educational institutions to escape liability in similar contexts. This inequity is certainly beyond the
political power of student-athletes to remedy. An effective remedy for student-athletes would require a court that is motivated
by a representation-reinforcement framework to intervene on
student-athletes' behalves.
Title IX may be the answer that student-athletes have been
looking for. A liberal interpretation of Title IX would give a
cause of action to student-athletes who were unfairly denied an
opportunity to obtain an education by the institution for which
94
they competed athletically.

90. ld. at 312.
91. !d. at 311-12.
92. 391 N.E.2d at 1353-54.
98. John G. Culhane, Reinvigorating Educational Malpractice Claims: A Representational Focus, 67 Wash. L. Rev. 349, 359 (1992).
94. See Gohl, supra n. 55, at 1125.
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In enacting Title IX, Congress was silent as to whether a
private right of action exists when a student-athlete is denied
equal access to educational opportunities; however, the court
may still imply such a cause of action from the statutory language. Courts make implications all of the time. Arguably, the
most important private right of action in securities law has
95
been implied from a statute that is as vague as Title IX. Because courts saw a pressing need to protect investors, Rule 10b5 of the Securities Act of 1933 has been interpreted to prohibit
material misrepresentations and omissions in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security. Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted that Rule 10b-5 is now "a judicial oak which has grown
96
from little more than a legislative acorn."
If the judiciary were to infer a cause of action from Title IX,
universities would be forced to shift their emphasis from athletics to academics or face the risk of liability. Thus, schools
would have an incentive to invest more of their time and resources towards ensuring that student-athletes are both qualified to attend the school and that they receive quality educations. At the very least, schools would be compelled not to
misrepresent the likelihood of the student-athlete being academically successful. Universities would no longer be able to do
things that prevent the academic success of their studentathletes, such as scheduling practices during study times or
choosing "soft" classes to maintain the student-athlete's eligibility.

VII. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO EXPANDED LIABILITY
In order to infer a cause of action for student-athletes from
Title IX, several problems must be overcome. The vagueness of
Title IX would need to be clarified by providing courts a standard of review to determine what constitutes actionable negligence by a university. As demonstrated by other courts, setting
a standard of review that clarifies Title IX would be difficult
97
but not impossible. Second, courts would need a compelling
reason to intervene. Courts would be unlikely to intervene
95. See William A. Klein, J. Mark Ramseyer & Stephen M. Bainbridge, Business
Associations: Cases and Materials on Agency, Partnerships, and Corporations, 426-27
(4th ed., Found. Press 2000).
96. Blue Chip StampH v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
97. See Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1353-54.
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unless motivated by a constitutional mandate to correct a
Fourteenth Amendment violation. Third, courts will be reluctant to recognize a special relationship between educational institutions and student-athletes because it may be difficult to
limit such a duty to student-athletes. Recovery for educational
malpractice liability under an inferred Title IX cause of action
would be limited, by definition, to student-athletes.
Of course, the latter issue would not limit liability under
the rationale used by the Sain court. Whether schools will become liable to the general student population was a major concern to the dissent in Sain v. Cedar Rapids Community School
District:
Implicit in the majority's reasoning is the suggestion that,
when it comes to NCAA eligibility rules and athletic scholarships, business is the name of the game. But, the cause of action we recognize today will not be limited to athletes. It will
apply to all students, whether talented in music or debate or
98
academics."

It is true that it would be difficult to limit the scope of the
special duty of a school to a student-athlete if such a duty is
created based on the rationale used in Sain. The problem is
that Sain creates liability for schools without establishing limits as to whom the school will be liable to. Iowa, in deciding
Sain, was the first jurisdiction to recognize a cause of action for
negligent misrepresentation by a school counselor to a student.
There is no reason that this liability should or could be limited
99
to allowing student-athletes to recover, yet this is a risk the
court appears to recognize and accept.
The risk of exposing schools to educatlonal malpractice
suits brought by all types of students will likely prevent most
other jurisdictions from following Iowa's precedent. For this
reason, it seems unlikely that the Sain case will set an immediate precedent for imposition of large-scale liability to all students.
The Constitution of the United States does not guarantee
the right to education. Although many state constitutions
guarantee the right to obtain an education, the U.S. Supreme
Court has said that there is no right to education mandated by

98. 626 N.W. 2d at 130.
99. /d. at 125-129.
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the U.S. Constitution.
Indeed, the Supreme Court said,
"[e]ducation ... is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any ba101
sis for saying it is implicitly so protected."
The Supreme
Court's position provides one of the reasons why courts have relentlessly rejected educational malpractice claims. It is noteworthy that Rodriguez, like Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified
102
School District, and other flagship cases cited to justify refusal to consider educational malpractice claims, is thirty years
old. If the Supreme Court were to reexamine this issue, it
might decide differently. However, as the case law currently
stands, there is no general constitutional right to a public education.
For these reasons, potential plaintiffs would have to overcome some substantial objections to achieve a general judicial
recognition of the tort of educational malpractice. Many of
these objections have taken on the status of nearly irrefutable
dogma, such as the policy concerns the court listed in Peter W.
It is very doubtful that Sain v. Cedar Rapids Community
School District will have this kind of overwhelming effect.
However, it is possible, based on precedent in Sain, to convince
courts to carve out an exception for student athletes if courts
can find a way to limit a school's duty to protect from expanding to include all students.

VIII. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to know how Sain v. Cedar Rapids Community
School District will affect the relationship between student103
athletes and educational institutions in other jurisdictions.
The Iowa Supreme Court may receive nothing but derision
from its judicial peers, or this case may begin a new and novel
chapter in educational malpractice history: one in which
schools become liable for their torts, at least in the limited context of student-athlete exploitation.
The Sain court went out of its way to hold that the Cedar
Rapids Community School District could be liable for negligent

100.
101.
102.
103.

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
ld.
131 Cal. Rptr. 854.
626 N.W.2d 115.
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misrepresentation. The court held this way despite the fact
that a school district had never before been liable for the negligent misrepresentations of its guidance counselor to stu104
dents. Strong public policy arguments have prevented school
liability in the past. However, it may be that in balancing those
fears with the danger of allowing public schools and universities to exploit their student-athletes with impunity, the courts
have discovered a countervailing interest of equal magnitude.
The Sain court probably found the school liable because it recognized that in this time of increasing commercialization of
athletic competition at all levels, student-athletes will become
increasingly exploited unless courts intervene. The court was
trying to create an incentive for schools to put a heavier emphasis on the "student" aspect of their responsibilities to
counter the emphasis society is increasingly placing on the
"athlete" portion.

Patricia Abbott

104. !d. at 125.

